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GLOBAL  NETWORKS:  ISSUES  AND  TACTICS  
 
IN  THE  BAKUN  DAM  PROJECT 
 
 
The role of global networks is increasingly important in influencing state’s 
decision on grand project. Tactics and strategies are employed across borders to 
build up cases and arguments to influence state’s decision. Global actors such as 
the non-governmental organizations particularly environmentalist groups adopt 
strategies that bypass their state and search out for international allies to bring 
pressure on their state from outside. Sahabat Alam Sekitar (SAM) and other 
international allies who are members of World Commission on Dam (WCD) rally 
campaigns for the severe environmental and social structure effect on the Bakun 
dam project. Global networks presented their findings on eight large dams that 
have put pressure on the Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and the Malaysian 
government to reconsider the big-dam project. Here the discussions on tactics 
and strategies by global networks are vital because a similar analysis can be 
applied in examining the impact of global networks on state’s decision. However, 
actions from global networks have to be consistent and continuous to convince 
state actors. Local networks have to find ways to redefine issues concerning 
environments and people who are affected as a way to maintain endorsement 
from international networks. If supports are not consistent and continuous, the 
impact of collective efforts from global networks is rather subtle or perhaps 
forgettable. 
 
Keywords: Global Network, Bakun, Organization 
 
Peranan jaringan organisasi global dalam mempengaruhi keputusan aktor dalam 
negara terhadap projek mega semakin penting. Strategi dan taktik merentasi 
sempadan digunakan oleh organisasi global untuk membina kes dan hujah yang 
rasional sebagai usaha untuk mempengaruhi keputusan negara. Organisasi 
global seperti badan bukan kerajaan atau kumpulan pencinta alam yang 
memperjuangkan isu alam sekitar telah mengaplikasikan strategi dan taktik yang 
melepasi sempadan negara dengan menubuhkan jaringan kerjasama di peringkat 
antarabangsa. Jaringan ini merupakan usaha untuk memberi tekanan terhadap 
dasar mana-mana negara yang tidak akur akan kepentingan pembangunan lestari 
yang mengiktiraf eko-sistem yang seimbang. Dalam melihat pembinaan 
empangan Bakun di Sarawak, jaringan organisasi global telah berkongsi 
maklumat lapan empangan besar lain di dunia sebagai bukti kepincangan projek 
tersebut. Usaha ini bertujuan untuk memberi tekanan terhadap Asea Brown 
Boveri (ABB) dan kerajaan Malaysia supaya mempertimbangkan implikasi 
pembinaaan empangan Bakun ini. Artikel ini membincangkan hubungan strategi 
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dan taktik yang digunakan oleh organisasi jaringan global dengan usaha 
mempengaruhi keputusan aktor dalam negara. Walau bagaimanapun, usaha dan 
kerjasama organisasi jaringan global ini harus konsisten dan berterusan untuk 
mempengaruhi keputusan pemimpin negara. Jaringan organisasi tempatan juga 
harus mencari jalan mendefinisikan semula isu-isu berkaitan alam sekitar dan 
manusia untuk menarik perhatian jaringan organisasi global ini. Jika bantuan 
dan sokongan tidak berterusan dan konsisten, impak jaringan kerjasama 
organisasi global ini tidak memberi makna dan akan dilupakan. 
 
Katakunci: Global Network, Bakun, Organisasi 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the issue of the Bakun dam project in Sarawak, Malaysia. The 
discussion includes other issues such as the effect on environments, the social structure of 
indigenous people, and the underlying problems of political factors. It also analyzes the 
tactics used by the domestic environmental non-governmental organizations as well as 
the environmental worldwide organizations, in order to lobby the Malaysian government 
and the Multilateral Economic Institutions. Such institutions as the World Bank 
(WORLD BANK), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN), have been forced to change their position on the effect of big-dam 
projects on environments.  In addition, the framework of the boomerang strategy and the 
persuasion tactics which is composed of four fundamental tenets define the webbing 
cooperation among non-governmental organizations to influence state’s decision; the 
information politic, symbolic politic, leverage politic, and accountability politic. 
 Initially, Malaysia, comprising Peninsular Malaysia and the Eastern Malaysian 
states of Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo Island, occupies a land area of 328,550 square 
kilometers, with a coastline 4,675 kilometers in length. A federation of 13 states and 2 
federal territories, Malaysia has a population of over 20 millions (July 1997 estimate). 
The diversified economy is characterized largely by light and heavy industry, agriculture 
and services, with the main income earners being electronic equipment, manufactured 
products, which include petroleum and natural gas, palm oil, timber, rubber, and tourism. 
Rapid industrialization and economic growth over the past two decades have transformed 
Malaysia from a predominantly agricultural country into an industrialized one. 
 In addition, Malaysia established the vision 2020 as a set of plan that envisages 
Malaysia to become a fully developed industrialized country. One of many ways outlined 
to achieve this goal is the big dam project. The Bakun dam project is assumed to be able 
to contribute in several ways: 
 
(a) To supply electricity. In recent years demand for power has increased up to 13% 
per year. The 2400 mega watt (mw) produced by the Bakun dam is expected to be 
required by the year 2000; 
 
(b) To increase employment opportunity; 
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(c) To promote regional development and industrialization river regulation, tourism, 
and fishery; 
 
(d) To reduce air pollution through proper planning of precautionary measures that 
can control the negative impacts. 
 
The Bakun dam was first examined more than 30 years ago by Australian surveyors. 
Subsequent studies identify numerous potential of Bakun dam to supply cheap hydro-
electric. By 1986, the Malaysian government had decided to build the Bakun dam project.  
The Bakun dam if completely built has 204 meter in height, would be the largest dam in 
Southeast Asia. The cost for this mega project is about $7 billion Canadian dollar that 
assumed to be able to generate 2400mw, which would provide electricity for both 
Sarawak and industrial cities in mainland Malaysia, through a cable under the South 
China Sea. At 650 kilometers, this cable would be the longest undersea cable in the 
world.1
On the other hand, the environmental NGOs view claims that this project destroys 
environments and social structure
 
However, the Bakun dam project invites a high controversial issue to 
environmentalist and local people against the Malaysian government. The Malaysian 
government claims that this project promises high electricity supply for the use of 
national development. In addition, Prime Minister Mahathir on September 24, 1991 
explained the government’s effort to support this hydroelectricity project tremendously. 
He stated “We in the poor countries would like to have some cheap hydroelectric power. 
But all manner of campaigns are mounted against our proposals the World Bank will be 
used to deprive poor countries of cheap hydroelectric power. And all this after the rich 
countries have developed most of their hydro potentials…”(Aliran,1995:34). The 
Malaysian government argues that developed countries manipulate the environment 
issues to put pressure on the third world development, which is unfair for the third world 
development process.  
2 of the indigenous people. In fact, this project would 
force the resettlement of 9,000 to 10,000 people in order to generate high cost electricity 
that no market might exist. Furthermore, domestic NGOs such as Sahabat Alam Malaysia 
(SAM), the Consumer Association of Penang (CAP), The Ratepayers Association of 
Penang (RAAP), and the Third World Network (TWN)3
                                               
1 
, had sought support from the 
international environmental NGOs to collectively oppose the Bakun dam project. SAM 
that represents other domestic NGOs has been vociferous in its resistance to the Bakun 
http://www.idsnet.org/resources/dams/bakun/bakundam.html. 
2 The Bakun dam project would force about 9,000 to 10,000 members of the Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan, 
Ukit, and Penan ethnic groups to resettle from their land. This action results in native people suffering from 
distress, dispossession, and poverty. The indigenous people can no longer participate in their cultural and 
traditional events. They can no longer gather together, farm, fish, weave, etc. 
http://www.irn.org/programs/bakun/aa.000509.html. 
 
3 SAM was founded in 1978 by its President, S.Mohammed Idris, a businessman who also started the CAP 
(1969), Asia-Pacific Peoples Environment Network (APPEN, 1983), the Third World Network (1984). 
SAM’s other concerns include resource depletion, loss indigenous seeds, abuse of pesticides in agriculture 
and soil contamination. It has extensive news service and numerous single publications. SAM address is 27 
Lorong Mentakal, 10250 Penang, Malaysia. Fax number: (604)-227-5705. 
http://www.rightlivelihood.se/recip.1988_4html. 
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dam project which threatens environmental quality. However, domestic NGOs in 
Malaysia faced many challenges to have their stand to sue (locus standi), which will be 
recognized by courts. Domestic NGOs are generally viewed with suspicion and 
stigmatization for their “anti-development” positions. Moreover, the political 
environments do not overtly encourage an open debate for this controversial issue. In 
fact, public discussion and essential information concerning the project has often been 
banned or has become inaccessible. Although Canada (British Columbia and Quebec) 
and other nations have increasingly rejected large dam, this technology is still being 
promoted in Malaysia, because the political environments hind the open debate and the 
free-flow of information. For example, the 17 feasibility and design studies made on the 
Bakun dam since it was first discussed, remained classified under the Official Secret Act 
(OSA)4
SAM, IRN, the Brazillian Movement (MAB), Narmada Movement (NBA), the 
Berne Declaration, and the Association for International Water and Forest Studies 
(FIVAS)
 (Spires,1995:12). 
Therefore, the discouraging political sphere, and lack of financing, manpower, 
and research resources have encouraged SAM to find support from the worldwide 
environmental organizations. SAM has invited the International Rivers Network (IRN) 
shortly after the Environmental Report was released in 1995. The IRN evaluates the 
report and identifies numerous negative impacts which include: reservoir deterioration, 
downstream water pollution, salt water intrusion, risk of waterborne disease, loss of fish 
and wildlife habitat, and social structure of the indigenous people. (Alan Tan,2001:3-4). 
5
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, SAM with help from The Berne Declaration and other 
international NGOs, campaigned to address the environmental impact on the Bakun dam 
project at the international level. Sam has called the international NGOs to urge the 
Malaysian government and the Sarawak state to set up an independent commission to 
investigate and attend to all resettlement issues raised by the native people. At the 
international level, on November 23, 1997 the IRN led by Patrick McCully, and other 
NGOs organizations, had decided not to take part in the WCD conference in Washington 
, which all of them are members of World Commission on Dam (WCD), have 
collectively protested the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs that 
funded mega-dam projects all over the world. The most popular protest movement was 
the non-violent satyagraha movement in India by the NBA led by Medha Paker. These 
environmental organizations also organized the global protest in 1998 from World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Seattle to IMF and WORLD BANK in Washington, extended to 
Melbourne and Prague (Easton,2000:1).   
                                               
4 Official Secret Act (OSA) was amended in 1982 as an attempt to legally create a law that protect 
confidential information from being circulated in the society under the name of national security 
(Jomo,1999:68-69). 
 
5The International Rivers Network (IRN) is a Berkeley, California-based human rights and environment 
group which work to support the rights of dam-affected communities and promote sustainable and 
equitable means of water and energy management. The Brazilian Movement (Movimentos dos Atingidos 
por Barragens – MAB) represents tens of thousands of Brazillian small farmers who have been displaced or 
are threatened by dams in Brazil, the Narmada Movement (NBA) the world’s largest and best-known anti-
dam group is comprised of tens of thousands of villagers from the valley of the Narmada River. They have 
led a 15-year-long non-violent struggle against dams on the Narmada. The Berne Declaration is a Swiss 
NGO with 16,000 members, and FIVAS is an association for water and forest studies located in Norway. 
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D.C on November 24, 1997. This protest occurs because the WCD sponsors, the World 
Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) have refused to allow fair 
representation from the dam-affected people and dam critics. The IRN and other NGOs 
criticized the World Bank and IUCN for their unbalanced view that excluded 
organizations representing people displaced by dams. The IRN argues that the WORLD 
BANK and IUCN need to be inclusive of the views given by NGOs. This protest 
successfully changes the WORLD BANK and IUCN position to accept independent and 
unbiased assessment of NGOs and dam-affected people in the future. 
Due to the acceptable stand voiced by the World Bank and the IUCN, the WCD 
released a 389 page report titled “Dams and Development–A New Framework for 
Decision-making”, in London on 17 November, 1999. This report provides significant 
ideas on values, criteria, and guidelines for government reference on future decisions 
with regard to dam building (Eaton,2000:5). WCD has prepared the alternative ways to 
provide future energy in order to counter provocative questions from the World Bank and 
IMF. Previously, the World Bank and IMF have urged WCD to show them a clear and 
sustainable ways to provide food, energy, stability, and running water for those who need 
it most. Therefore, WCD conducted detailed reviews of eight large dams in Turkey, 
Norway, United States, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Brazil, and 
South Africa. It also prepared reviews on the large-scale dams for countries like India and 
China, as well as a briefing paper on Russia and the newly independent states.6
1. Large dams deliver significant development services in more than 140 countries. 
On a global scale hydropower dams account for 19% of electricity generated and 
for an estimated 12-16% of global food production. 12% of large dams supply 
domestic and industrial water, and large dams provide flood control services in 
more than 70 countries. 
  
The commission found several substantial consequences with regard to large dam 
projects. The implications are: 
 
 
2. Large dams display a high degree of variability in delivering predicted water and 
electricity services–and related social benefits–with a considerable portion falling 
short of physical and economic targets, while others continue to generate benefits 
after 30-40 years. 
 
3. Large dams have demonstrated a marked tendency towards schedule delays and 
cost overruns. 
 
4. Large dams have led to the loss of forests and wildlife habitat and the loss of 
aquatic biodiversity of upstream and downstream fisheries. The Commission 
found that efforts to counter the ecosystem deteriorations caused by the large 
dams had limited success. 
 
5. The negative social impacts of the large dams reflect a pervasive and systematic 
failure to assess and account for the range of potential negative impacts on 
displaced and resettled people as well as downstream communities. Estimates 
                                               
6 http://www.dams.org/press/pressrelease.00743.htm. 
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suggest that some 40-80 million dam-affected people worldwide have been 
displaced while the livelihoods of many more living downstream affected were 
not recognized. Mitigation, compensation and resettlement programs were often 
inadequate. 
 
In spite of the significant findings regarding large dam projects, the Commission 
also examined the alternatives for meeting energy, water and food needs. They found that 
while there is far greater scope for utilizing these energies, there is no universal formula 
that precludes local and national conditions as being central to determining viable 
options. The alternative suggestions by the Commission are: 
 
1. A number of environmentally and economically viable supply options are 
emerging, including wind and solar energy, recycling, and local water 
management. However, obstacles such as market, institutional, intellectual, and 
financial barriers limit the adoption rate of alternatives. 
 
2. WCD suggests that each country has to improve its water system management, 
particularly in the irrigation sector through the reduction in water losses. An 
efficient system management and an upgrading of distribution technology can 
alleviate demand for new supply resources. 
 
3. Demand-side management has significant potential and provides a major   
opportunity to reduce water stress and power requirements. 
 
These set of several feasible alternatives to dams for water and energy resources 
development, are meant to be as a guideline to encourage the national government to 
carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages that might cost others substantially. 
Based on the WCD large dams research findings, SAM closed involvement with 
the IRN, the Berne Declaration, Movimento dos Atingidos por Barraagens-MAB 
(Brazil), Narmada Bachao Andolan-NBA (India), and other 120 NGOs environmental 
actors, their collective actions have urged the Swedish-Swiss engineering corporation, 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB)7 to withdraw its operation from the controversial Bakun 
hydro-electric power in Sarawak, Malaysia. The NGOs sent a letter8
                                               
7The ABB was founded in 1988, the result of a merger between the European Engineering giants Asea of 
Sweden and Brown Boveri of Switzerland. The ABB had established itself as the dominant manufacturer of 
power generation equipment in several important Eastern European markets: moved aggressively into 
India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, expanded in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. 
 to the ABB’s senior 
executive, Percy Barnevik in Zurich, to warn that the company’s involvement in the 
large-scale dam has directly contradicted with its principal stand on sustainable 
development. They added that even Sweden and Switzerland have long abandoned large-
scale hydroelectric projects. The Bakun dam will involve the flooding of 69,640 hectares 
of land, an area larger than Singapore, including large tracts of forest, and the force 
resettlement of some 9,000 to 10,000 indigenous people belonging to Kayan, Kenyah, 
Kayang,Ukit, Lanang, and Penan ethnic groups (Jaura,1996:5-6). In addition, the NGOs 
http://www/evb.ch/bd/abbl.html. 
8The letter was signed by Patrick McCully of the IRN, Mats Djurberg of the Swedish Society for Nature, 
Ellen Hofsvang of FIVAS in Norway, and other 29 members of European Parliament. (Jaura,1996:6). 
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recalled that over the years the ABB had issued statements supporting the need for 
sustainable development. The company’s 1994 report entitled “Asea Brown Boveri 
Environmental Management Programs” noted that protection of the environments was 
among its top corporate priorities and addressed the environmental issues in all its 
operation and public policy. The NGOs believe that the continuous participation of ABB 
will undermine seriously the company’s reputation and that of other companies with the 
world business council for sustainable development. 
Consequently, there are a few essential implications due to the intensive lobbying 
of the domestic and international NGOs. Firstly, the ABB terminated the $5.4 billion 
agreement on September 3, 1997, with the Malaysian government. This is because the 
highly controversial environmental conflicts with the worldwide NGOs and the native 
people’s objections regarding environmental destruction. Secondly, this termination had 
forced the Malaysian government to declare the reevaluation of the Bakun dam project. 
The announcement was made as part of a tactic to reestablish investor confidence and 
country accountability in the Malaysian future economy. Besides, the Malaysian 
government has to accept the fact that this project is unnecessary and financially 
wasteful. Moreover, the Sarawak state has already produced more hydro-energy up to 
1700mw , which is adequately more than enough for the use of the country. In addition, 
other large-scale dam projects such as in the Mekong-Basin, Thailand, has high potential 
to supply energy for the Asian regional needs.   
Moreover, the third implication addresses the Malaysian government’s decision to 
compensate 15 indigenous communities for the destruction caused due to the first and 
second phases in the construction of the Bakun dam project. Obviously, the first and 
second phases of the Bakun dam project had brought hardships to most indigenous 
people from ethnic Kenyahs, Ukits and Kayans, where their villages were flooded and 
destroyed. The government has to locate resettlement areas for these native peoples and 
provide suitable living accommodations, basic infrastructure, such as schools, medical 
centers, and electricity and water supply, and lands for planting crops. However, the 
compensation and resettlement programs have created an on-going protest against the 
government’s rhetorical actions. For example, a few hundred kilometers from the Bakun 
site sits the smaller Batang Ai dam, which was completed in 1985. For that project, 3,000 
native people were relocated to an area lacking adequate farmland, basic facilities, and 
jobs. Many have not yet received fair compensation, and almost half of the dam-affected 
people have returned to areas near to their original homeland. As a result, the Bakun site 
resettlement and compensation programs appear not to have benefited from this 
experience. Resettlement plans have been marked by a general failure to consult those 
affected. As Nyaban Kulleh, a resident of one of the communities affected told a 
journalist in 1994, “no one has come forward to tell us what is happening. We don’t want 
to go against the government. But if the government wants the Bakun project, why don’t 
they think of us? They say this is development but we don’t think that flooding our homes 
is development” (Jerome,1994: 56).  
Finally, the fourth implication highlights the extensive result from the 
reevaluation of the Bakun dam project. This reevaluation has more or less diminished the 
interest of foreign investors to work on large-scale dam projects in Southeast Asia. The 
salient example is the cancellation of the $1.5 billion dam projects in Nam Thuen in 
Loas. These four substantial implications caused by the NGOs worldwide significantly 
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show how the effort of networks can tremendously change the national government 
position, the international perspectives on environmental issues, protect the rights of 
indigenous people, and strongly defend the vulnerability of unspoken environments. 
 
Strategies and Tactics 
 
Based on the main issues addressed in the Bakun dam project, I analyze the tactics 
employed by domestic NGOs which entail the involvement of worldwide networks to put 
pressure on the Malaysian government. The boomerang strategy and the four persuasive 
tactics will represent the theoretical framework for this paper. Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
emphasize that the boomerang pattern appears when the government as the primary 
guarantor of rights, has blocked the domestic NGOs from addressing the issue. Thus, 
domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out for international allies to try to 
bring pressure on their state from outside. 
Based on this pattern, SAM, that represents domestic NGOs in Malaysia, has 
faced great challenges and pressures from the Malaysian government to address the 
environmental impact on the Bakun dam project. In addition, the domestic political 
sphere has restricted SAM from organizing public debate and getting access to 
information, and has limited media coverage of opposing views from the dam-affected 
people. In fact, SAM and other domestic NGOs were banned through the legal device, 
the OSA, from disseminating information regarding the WCD findings on the 
environmental impact on the project. The absence of open access to information, lack of 
freedom for public discussion, lack of independent financial support, manpower and 
research resources, are the main reasons for SAM to invite worldwide environmental 
organizations to collectively intervene on the Bakun dam project. Therefore, SAM 
bypassed the Malaysian government and sought help from the international allies to put 
pressure on the Malaysian government. SAM has contacted powerful members of WCD 
such as, IRN, NBA, MAB, the Berne Declaration, FIVAS, and other 120 NGOs all over 
the world to campaign on the Bakun dam issues in order to gain support from the 
international organizations. 
Furthermore, the four vital persuasion tactics provide a framework to understand 
strategies employed by SAM. Since the domestic and international NGOs do not have a 
legitimate powerful authority in the traditional sense, they use the power of information, 
ideas, and strategies to alter the information and values within which states make 
policies. Thus, the environmental NGOs put effort into persuasion, socialization, and 
pressure of four tactics in order to influence powerful actors. The first tactic is the 
information politic. Information is powerful enough to bind the worldwide NGOs 
together and is substantial for network effectiveness. The environmental NGOs mutually 
exchange their information through telephone, e-mail, fax, and circulation of pamphlets, 
bulletins and newsletters. According to the sharing information phenomena, SAM has 
distributed information on the Bakun dam project to the environmental NGOs all over the 
world. The mutual exchange of information and ideas regarding the effect of large dam 
project has enabled them to challenge the national institution: the Malaysian government. 
As SAM and other relevant environmental organizations share the same values and goals 
of securing environments upon destruction, they believe that transnational networks will 
further their missions. In addition, SAM provides information to the transnational 
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networks, which is not available to be obtained publicly or might not be heard elsewhere. 
This information becomes comprehensive and very useful to activists who may be 
geographically distant. Moreover, the environmental activists will interpret facts and 
frame issues in terms of right and wrong in order to persuade people and to stimulate 
them to act. As a result, sharing information allows the transnational environmental 
networks to attain greater visibility to wider publics and multiply channels of institutional 
access. In addition, sharing information has great impact on the Multilateral Economics 
Institution (MEI), the Malaysian government and the ABB, because the research findings 
from the WCD environmental research studies have immensely managed to convince 
these three actors to change their positions on the large-scale dams, especially, the Bakun 
dam project.  
The second persuasion tactic is the symbolic politic. This tactic includes the way 
of framing issues by identifying and providing convincing explanation for powerful 
symbolic events. Symbolic interpretation is part of the process of persuasion by which the 
domestic and transnational networks create awareness and expand their constituencies 
(Keck & Sikkink,1998:22). Based on this tactic SAM and the international environmental 
NGOs frame the suffering of the indigenous people in Sarawak as a vital issue to attract 
worldwide attention. The destruction caused by the building of the Bakun dam 
constructions, which has demolished the native people’s land and flooded their villages, 
has been used as an essential symbolic component to persuade international institutions 
and policymakers to change their minds. In addition, foreign journalists who came to 
Sarawak play an essential role in revealing the true situations of the native people’ 
suffering conditions. For example, Bruno Manser, a Swedish activist spent five years in 
helping the ethnic Penan with the deforestation issues in Sarawak and was proactively 
involved with opposing the Bakun dam project. During his years in Sarawak, Bruno 
Manser had published numerous articles addressing the poor conditions of the indigenous 
people and the impact of environments.9
I dedicate the song or “parap” (an offering in song and rice-wine), translated by 
Jerome Rosseau, sung by a Kenyah grandmother to explicate the suffering of the 
 Another environmental activist is Jerome 
Rosseau, who published his article on the Bakun dam project and the failure of 
resettlement planning for the indigenous people. This article not only provides a 
comprehensive critique on the Bakun dam project, but also contains pictures of the poor 
conditions of the dam-affected people.   
Furthermore, SAM and transnational NGOs intentionally frame the issue of 
jeopardizing the indigenous people’s health through the impact of the Bakun dam project. 
The IRN, especially, addresses the numerous ranges of implications - particularly, the 
risk of waterborne diseases due to the deterioration of downstream water quality, that will 
severely jeopardize the life of dam-affected people. Diseases such as cholera and diarrhea 
are the major concern of the indigenous people’s health. In addition, as they previously 
do not receive a proper water supply, the polluted water caused by the dam construction 
would make the situation worse (William,1995:6-5). Based on the tactic employed by 
SAM and the transnational environmental NGOs, and the individual role of foreign 
journalists, the symbolic pictures of dam-affected people are highlighted and have been 
successfully framed to attract international attention.  
                                               
9 http://forests.org/indomalay/netpanorama.html. 
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indigenous people caused by the Bakun dam project.10
                                               
10Rousseau, Jerome, in “The Bakun Hydro-electric project and resettlement: a failure of planning”. 
Conference on the Bakun project, Kuala Lumpur, December 2-3, 1995. 
 This song could be viewed as a 
symbolic protest of the Bakun dam project that might inspire others to understand the 
hardships these indigenous people face in order to survive. 
 
“We are happy you came among us. 
For soon, we worry, we may drown 
Because of Bakun. 
We are mourning, due to our problems. 
Share your ideas with us, so we can have courage. 
Please help us, please tell your friend, 
And others in the world outside, 
That we have our problems 
So that you and they can help us, one way or other. 
Please remember us and our plight 
Wherever you go, wherever you may be” 
 
 The third tactic is the leverage politic. This tactic promotes the need for political 
effectiveness that channels its powerful information and symbolic politics to target actors. 
In the case of the Bakun dam project, SAM and the transnational environmental 
organizations have collectively pressured the Multilateral Economic Institutions, the 
World Bank, IMF and  IUCN, and the Malaysian government to change their positions on 
the large scale dam projects. SAM has contacted the powerful environmental NGOs to 
get involved with the Bakun dam issues. SAM has invited the IRN, MAB, NBA, the 
Berne declaration, FIVAS and 120 other environmental NGOs to lobby the Malaysian 
government and the MEI. As I have stated earlier in this paper, the demonstration of the 
IRN that represents other NGOs who are members of WCD, has led the protest on WCD 
sponsors (the WORLD BANK, IMF and IUCN) to fairly accept dam-affected people’s 
views and carry this positive response to the WCD conference. The MEI has been 
forcefully pressured by the environmental NGOs to accept views from dam-affected 
people and encourage the MEI to refer to the environmental guidelines produced by the 
research studies on the impacts of big dam projects. This persuasive tactic is fruitful, as 
the MEI has changed its mind to accept the alternative of energy resources and the 
guideline for future decisions on the big dam projects’ investment. In fact, the 
environmental guideline has great ideas on energy innovation, which emphasize solar and 
wind energies that might attract the MEI to invest in the research and development 
programs for future energy resources. Another significant contribution regarding the 
understanding of leverage politics is the success of the transnational environmental 
organizations in lobbying the ABB to terminate the agreement with the Malaysian 
government regarding the Bakun dam project. The termination of the agreement between 
the ABB and the Malaysian government has tremendously affected Malaysia’s decision 
to continue building the Bakun dam project. As a result, the Malaysian government has to 
announce the reevaluation of this mega project. 
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The fourth tactic is the accountability politic. This tactic is used to expose the 
distance between discourse and practice (Keck & Sikkink,1998:24). The transnational 
networks will make use of statements or reports by the government or other actors that 
contradict with practice. The available statements or reports made by the government or 
other actors will be used to question their accountability if their practice diverts from 
their discourse. This exposure could embarrass government and other actors that might 
try to cover the revealing facts. Based on the Bakun dam issues, the transnational 
environmental organizations have questioned the accountability of the ABB that claims 
to promote sustainable development and secure environments. The transnational 
networks have used the ABB’s 1994 report entitled “ABB Environmental Management 
Programs” that claimed to protect environments as among company’s top priorities. Yet, 
the practice diverted from its discourse when the ABB signed the $5.4 billion agreement 
with the Malaysian government on the Bakun dam mega project. The transnational 
environmental networks sent a letter to the ABB’s senior executive and warned that the 
company’s involvement in the large-scale dam had directly contradicted its principal 
stand on sustainable development. The networks also provided the research findings on 
the environmental impact and the destruction of the indigenous people’s societal 
structure. The tactic to expose the contradiction between discourse and practice as to 
question the accountability of the ABB, resulted in the termination of the agreement and 
strict evaluation on the Bakun dam project.   
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the application of four persuasion tactics employed by the environmental 
networks has contributed significantly to reevaluation of the Bakun dam project. The 
information politic, symbolic politic, leverage politic, and accountability politic, have 
immensely provided strategies to enforce the MEI, the Malaysian government, and the 
ABB to change their positions on the environmental issues. Although SAM and other 
domestic NGOs are less capable in terms of financial support, manpower, and face some 
political and legal constraints, effective cooperation with the environmental worldwide 
networks has helped domestic NGOs to achieve their goals: to protect environments and 
dam-affected people. As the international and domestic environmental organizations 
share similar environmental values, this factor has united them to mutually exchange 
ideas, information, and stand together to challenge the institutions.  
Global networks direct their efforts and strategies to create pressure to the 
government. They exchange information, share findings of their research on the impact of 
big dam projects, and rally supports from various environmental groups to alert the state 
actors that the impacts of large-scale dams on environment and dam-affected people are 
crucial. Although global networks have a great influence to create awareness to people, 
international organizations, and private institutions, the state actors’ decision and 
authority might overcome or overrule the external pressure.  
In addition to the application of the four persuasive tactics, Figure 1, the 
boomerang pattern will explain how the process works even though this pattern has been 
reconstructed to fit in the Bakun dam analysis.  When global networks are connected, 
they are more likely to spread ideas, share knowledge and information to facilitate their 
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agenda on building cases against big-dam projects. In addition, they also facilitate and 
mobilize pooling of resources that can be invested in conducting conferences and 
research on big-dam project and environmental impacts. Wide global networks help 
members access to broad sources of information and improve ways to influence state’s 
actors.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 The Boomerang pattern on the Bakun dam project by global networks 
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The Boomerang model illustrated by Keck and Sikkink emphasizes that domestic NGOs 
are blocked by the national government and seek help from two distinct actors, another 
powerful foreign state and international NGO allies. On the contrary, model illustrated in 
Figure 1 has to exclude the foreign state as an actor, in order to fit in the Bakun case 
analysis. Therefore, based on Figure 1, SAM has been blocked by the Malaysian 
government to address the environmental impact on the Bakun dam project. SAM locates 
the powerful networks to deal with these issues.  During this process, SAM exchanges 
and transfers information to the international allies to review and evaluate the potential 
consequences of the Bakun dam project. The international allies who are members of 
WCD, comprising of IRN, NBA, MAB, the Berne Declaration, FIVAS, and 120 NGOs 
all over the world, helped SAM to campaign for the severe environmental and social 
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structure effect on the Bakun dam project. After numerous WCD conferences and studies 
conducted on eight large dams, the international allies together with SAM have put 
pressure on the ABB and the Malaysian government to reevaluate the mega project. 
Furthermore, the information provided by the WCD research studies on large-scale dams 
has significantly changed the MEI positions on the environmental issues, and the 
guideline on alternatives resource energy would attract MEI to invest in new energy 
projects. 
 Furthermore, SAM and the transnational networks have succeeded in several 
ways such as, framing issues in ways that make them fit into particular institutions 
venues, using information and symbols to reinforce their claims, identifying targets and 
seeking leverage over powerful actors to influence the Malaysian government and MEI. 
Their actions have caused a few changes, such as procedural change at the international 
and domestic levels in prohibiting the MEI from funding any large dam projects in the 
future, and encouraging the ABB to reject the agreement with the Malaysian government 
that entails in turn the reevaluation of the Bakun dam project. These significant 
behavioral changes in Malaysia and MEI have dispersed and influenced other state actors 
to avoid planning and building large-scale dam projects. In fact, the WDC’s proposal on 
alternatives energy has contributed new ideas for MEI and states actors to seek 
alternative energy for generating development projects. Consequently, SAM and 
transnational advocacy networks have gained success in influencing, lobbying, affecting, 
and promoting change within the national states actors and international institutions 
actors towards policy development. 
 Besides the boomerang strategy and the four persuasion tactics, there are other 
underlying issues that have been addressed along the discussion. Although the Bakun 
dam has been debated extensively and the outcome is satisfying, the need for greater 
openness and transparency in domestic political sphere is a fundamental requirement in 
viewing the environmental issues. In fact, the merits of a project such as the Bakun dam 
project should be publicly debated. It is well established that the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of environmental impact assessment and related decision-making processes 
are closely dependent on the openness and transparency of the policy process. 
 In Malaysia, however, this debate, and public discussion generally, has been 
hindered by restricted access to information and limitations on media coverage of 
opposing views. This is partly because the political environment hindered the open 
debate that led to abandon the important impacts on the environments and indigenous 
societal structure. Essential information concerning the project has often been 
inaccessible. For example, the 17 feasibility and design studies made on the Bakun dam 
project since it was first discussed remained classified under the Official Secret Act. 
Therefore, lack of public access to information and discussion became a major focus of 
controversy between 1994 and 1996 (Spires,1995:23). 
 Furthermore, official publications only provide indications of government and 
project proponent perspectives on the controversy. These publications aim to demonstrate 
that the project will have a range of positive benefits for Malaysian and those directly 
affected. The government even asserts that the dam would have environmental benefits 
including less air pollution, flood control, reduced soil erosion, parks and wildlife 
sanctuaries. On the other hand, the environmental evaluation evidences from the IRN 
shows contradictory environmental impacts from the government report.  As Patrick 
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McCully notes, “…the benefits the government provides are regularly exaggerated” 
(Borneo Post,1993:18).  Consequently, the absence of open accountability within the 
government and the private sector allows the crony-capital to seek large profits from the 
disastrous Bakun dam projects that potentially will benefit them.  
 To sum up this point, in the face of the persistent obstacles enforced through legal 
device, the issue of openness, transparency, and public debate are fundamental to the 
effectiveness of civil society: the non-governmental organizations. The need for greater 
openness, transparency, and accountability in decision-making regarding the mega 
projects that involve the environmental aspects are substantially necessary to ensure that 
the consequences of the policy design are not going to deprive other people and 
environments. In addition, Malaysia needs to change its political perspective to one that 
will encourage more open-mindedness of freedom of information dissemination, public 
debates, and the growth of civil society.  
 In fact, Malaysia still needs to invest in environmental research study, as it proves 
to be internationally attractive to the worldwide organizations. Besides, the 
environmental issues are powerful enough to change the ambitious government’s goal 
and finally leave the Malaysian government in a destructive financial loss of the initial 
investment due to the reevaluation of the Bakun dam project. Despite global networks 
and the boomerang tactics to persuade the government of Malaysia to reevaluate the 
Bakun-dam project, they failed to convince the Malaysian government to put a stop on 
the project. Continuously, issues on heavy sedimentation indicate a serious affect on the 
useful lifespan of the dam because it will reduce the volume of water and capacity of the 
dam.11 Another concern associated to the Bakun-dam project is the Bakun submarine 
cables; a proposed undersea cables that will be the longest global link. The integrity of 
this investment project has been questioned to whether or not it will safeguard local 
interest especially when job opportunities will be largely open to foreign workers.12
                                               
11New doubts over Malaysia’s Bakun Dam, by Anil Netto, Southeast Asia, Jul 10, 2001. 
http://www.atime.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IGI0Ae)1.html 
12 Ibid. 
 
 Although the boomerang tactics provide a feasible framework to analyze the 
global networks role and impact, consistency and continuity to redefine and readdress the 
issue is substantial to maintain global endorsements. Local networks have to maximize 
the use of global networks to deter projects that produce hazard to environments and 
humans. Therefore, persuasive arguments are substantially necessary to formulate new 
ideas and to produce a set of implications that show the vulnerability of the big-dam 
project to people who are affected directly and indirectly.  
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